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Abstract  
Global bonds are international securities designed to be traded and settled efficiently in 
multiple markets. This paper studies global bonds to examine the effects of multimarket 
trading on corporate bond liquidity, prices, and the cost of debt. Using a sample of 
primary and secondary market transactions matched by issuer, I find that global bonds 
command a significant liquidity and price advantage over comparable domestic bonds. 
On average, global bonds trade at yields 15 to 25 basis points below domestic bonds of 
the same issuers, with the difference being greater for speculative grade bonds and in 
times of crisis. Global issues are more liquid, as evidenced by several trade-based 
liquidity measures, but the liquidity advantage of global bonds does not fully explain the 
yield differential.  The findings imply that international corporate bond markets are not 
fully integrated, and global bond offerings can reduce the cost of debt.  
Keywords: Cost of debt, corporate bonds, liquidity, international financial markets.  
JEL classification: G15, G12, G32, F36. 5
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Large multinational corporations increasingly raise funds by issuing global bonds. 
Global bonds resemble U.S. domestic bonds in their design, but their distinctive features 
allow them to be traded in multiple markets. They are placed simultaneously with U.S. 
and overseas investors, and can be traded in the U.S. bond market, the Eurobond market, 
as well as between markets. However, the effects of multimarket trading on corporate 
bond value are not well understood. This paper studies the effects of multimarket trading 
on the cost of debt, corporate bond prices, and liquidity. I examine primary and 
secondary market prices of global bonds, and compare them with bonds issued by the 
same corporations in the domestic market. I further study corporate bond liquidity in 
secondary markets, and its relationship to multimarket trading.  
The results confirm the finding of Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005) that global 
bond issues are associated with a lower cost of debt financing than domestic issues. The 
costs of issuing global bonds, including interest costs and underwriter compensation, are 
on average 16 basis points lower that the costs of issuing U.S. domestic bonds. Relative 
to the Eurobond benchmark, the costs of issuing global bonds are almost 40 basis points 
lower. In addition, I find that global bond offerings reduce the cost of debt because 
multimarket trading enhances corporate bond value, and new global bond issues are 
priced at a premium relative to domestic bond issues of the same firms. On average, 
global bonds are offered at yield spreads 15 basis points below comparable U.S. domestic 
bonds, and 30 basis points below comparable Eurobonds.  These findings explain why 
global bonds have become in recent years the debt instrument of choice for large 
corporate issuers.  
When I examine trading prices from TRACE from 2003 to 2009, I find that the 
difference in issuance yields does not reflect temporary factors such as issuance price 
pressure or new issue underpricing because it carries over into secondary market prices. 
Rather, the difference shows that investors more highly value bonds that allow for 
multimarket trading. If two bonds of the same issuer, one global and one domestic, trade 
on the same day, the yield on the global bond is on average 23.8 basis points lower. The 
difference is greater for speculative grade bonds (-51.5 basis points) than for investment 
grade bonds (-11.6 basis points). Since high yield bonds are relatively expensive to trade, 6
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these findings indicate that transaction costs rule out profitable arbitrage between global 
and domestic bonds. In addition, I find an increase in the yield differential during the 
credit crisis of 2008 and 2009, suggesting that funding constraints may also limit 
arbitrage.  
I further examine the effects of multimarket trading on corporate bond liquidity. 
The results show that, compared with domestic bonds of the same issuers, global bonds 
are more liquid. They exhibit greater trading volumes in both the U.S. bond market and 
the Eurobond market, trade more frequently, and their prices are less volatile and less 
affected by trading volume. The liquidity advantage of global bonds persists even after 
controlling for their greater issue size ($1 bn. vs. $0.3 bn.). However, trade-based 
liquidity measures explain no more than 2% of the variation in yield spreads, and only a 
small part of the yield differential between global and domestic bonds. 
Overall, the results provide insights into the degree of international bond market 
integration, and have implications for the cost of debt. The findings imply that 
international bond markets are not fully integrated, and large issuers can lower their cost 
of debt by offering global bonds. Global bond offerings are associated with a lower cost 
of debt financing because investors require lower yields on bonds that can be traded and 
settled efficiently in multiple markets. Multimarket trading improves the liquidity of 
corporate bonds and creates value for investors.     
 
   7
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INTRODUCTION 
Rather than issuing bonds in domestic markets, many of the world’s largest 
corporations have recently started to issue global bonds. Global bonds are offered 
simultaneously to investors in the two major markets for dollar-denominated debt, 
namely the U.S. bond market and Eurobond market. Unlike domestic bonds, global bonds 
are designed for multimarket trading. These bonds include features that facilitate their 
trading, clearing, and settlement in the U.S. bond market, the Eurobond market, as well as 
between markets. Although first issued by the World Bank in 1989, global bonds have 
recently become the debt instrument of choice for large corporate issuers, and corporate 
global debt issuance exceeded U.S. domestic bond issuance and Eurobond issuance in 
recent years
2.   
Despite the increasing importance of global bonds, the effects of multimarket 
trading on corporate bond value are not well understood.  Miller and Puthenpurackal 
(2005) examine global bond offerings from the issuer’s perspective, and find that firms 
can lower their cost of debt by issuing global rather than domestic bonds. However, why 
global bond offers reduce borrowing costs remains unclear. The main objective of this 
paper is to identify and measure the benefits that global bonds offer to investors. The 
paper provides new evidence from secondary markets that can clarify why global bond 
issuers have a lower cost of debt.  I examine trading prices and liquidity of global and 
domestic bonds in secondary markets, and relate the cost advantage of global bonds to 
the effects of multimarket trading.  
Global bonds have key similarities when compared with U.S. domestic bonds. 
They are registered with the SEC, have similar indentures as U.S. bonds, and pay interest 
semiannually. The distinctive property of global bonds is their multimarket trading.  They 
are designed to trade simultaneously in the U.S. bond market and the Eurobond market, 
and have features that minimize cross-market transaction costs.  Multimarket trading 
could make global bonds more valuable to investors, lowering the yield that investors 
require to hold global bonds.  There are two reasons why multimarket trading may 
                                                 
2 According to the SDC New Issues Database, the proceeds from issuing global bonds exceeded the 
proceeds from issuing U.S. domestic bonds or Eurobonds in 2006, 2007, and 2008. Compared are all 
corporate issues of public, senior and unsecured bonds that are denominated in U.S. dollars.  8
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increase bond value.  First, by virtue of trading in several markets, global bonds have the 
potential to reach a wider international investor base and become more liquid. Prior 
research documents a positive relationship between corporate bond prices and their 
liquidity (see, e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), 
Bao, Pan, and Wang (2008)). Higher prices on global bonds could therefore reflect a 
liquidity premium. Second, global bonds have the capacity to span several credit markets. 
To the degree that international bond markets are not fully integrated (see, e.g., Stulz 
(1981), Errunza and Losq (1985)), investors may value the ability to trade global bonds in 
both the U.S. bond market and the Eurobond market.  
This paper examines the effects of multimarket trading on corporate bond 
liquidity, prices, and the cost of debt. To explore these effects, I first confirm the finding 
of Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005) that global bond offerings are associated with a 
lower cost of debt. Further, I test whether the cost advantage of global bonds reflects only 
lower issuance costs, or also higher market valuations of global bonds. The tests are 
conducted on both primary and secondary transaction prices. Next, I compute several 
trade-based measures of corporate bond liquidity, and test whether global bonds are more 
liquid than comparable domestic bonds. Finally, I test whether liquidity and transaction 
costs can explain the price differential between global and domestic bonds, or if the price 
differential reflects the ability of global bonds to span segmented markets.   
The methods and the data used in this paper represent a substantial improvement 
over most previous studies of corporate bonds. I exploit the fact that global bonds are 
typically issued by large corporations that have multiple debt issues outstanding in the 
domestic market as well as the global market. This allows me to better control for issuer 
credit risk by comparing prices and liquidity of bonds issued by the same firms in 
different markets.  Matching by issuer can also control for endogenous self-selection of 
firms into the group of global or domestic issuers. Therefore, I collect a matched sample 
of primary and secondary transactions in global and domestic bonds issued by the same 
corporations (global bond issuers). Primary market transactions are obtained from the 
New Issues Database of Securities Data Company (SDC). Secondary market transactions 9
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in the U.S. bond market are from TRACE
3, and additional information on trading activity 
in the Eurobond market is obtained from TRAX
4.  
I begin the analysis by confirming prior findings of Miller and Puthenpurackal 
(2005) regarding the cost of debt. In accordance with Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005), I 
find that the costs of issuing global bonds, including interest costs and underwriter 
compensation, are on average 16 basis points lower than the costs of issuing U.S. 
domestic bonds. Relative to the Eurobond benchmark, the costs of issuing global bonds 
are almost 40 basis points lower.  In addition, I show that global bond offerings have a 
lower cost of debt because global bond issues are priced at a premium relative to 
domestic bond issues of the same firms. On average, global bonds are offered at yield 
spreads 15 basis points below comparable U.S. domestic bonds, and 30 basis points 
below comparable Eurobonds.  Thus, investors pay premium prices for bonds that can be 
traded in multiple markets, which lowers the cost of debt for global bond issuers. These 
findings explain why global bonds have become in recent year the debt instrument of 
choice for large multinational corporations. 
Next, I examine trading prices from TRACE from 2003 to 2009.  I find that if two 
bonds of the same issuer, one global and one domestic, trade on the same day, the yield 
on the global bond is on average 23.8 basis points lower. Since the yields at which bonds 
trade in secondary markets reveal similar patterns as offering yields, the difference in 
offering yields between global and domestic bonds does not reflect temporary factors 
such as new issue underpricing (Cai et al. (2009)) or issuance price pressure (Newman 
and Rierson (2004)). Rather, the difference shows that investors more highly value bonds 
that allow for multimarket trading. In addition, the yield differential is greater for 
speculative grade bonds (-51.5 basis points) than for investment grade bonds (-11.6 basis 
points), and it increases during the credit crisis of 2008 and 2009. These findings indicate 
that transaction costs and funding constraints rule out profitable arbitrage between global 
and domestic bonds, since speculative grade bonds are relatively expensive to trade (see, 
                                                 
3 TRACE is the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine sponsored by the U.S. Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  
4 TRAX is the trade matching and regulatory system for the Eurobond market sponsored by the 
International Capital Markets Association (ICMA).  10
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e.g. Edwards et al. (2007)), and funding constraints limit arbitrage during financial crises 
(see, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), Stein (2009)). 
I also study the effects of multimarket trading on corporate bond liquidity. The 
results show that, compared with domestic bonds of the same issuers, global bonds are 
more liquid, even after controlling for well-known determinants of corporate bond 
liquidity such as bond age and issue size. Global bonds exhibit greater trading volumes in 
both the U.S. bond market and the Eurobond market, trade more frequently, and their 
prices are less volatile and less affected by trading volume. However, the trade-based 
liquidity measures explain no more than 2% of the variation in yield spreads, and only a 
small part of the yield differential between global and domestic bonds. The greater part of 
the yield differential between global and domestic bonds remains unexplained by 
common measures of corporate bond liquidity, and provides evidence of bond market 
segmentation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops the 
hypotheses, and Section II describes the data. Section III shows the empirical results, 
including the analysis of primary market prices and the cost of debt, secondary market 
prices, and the liquidity of global and domestic bonds. Section IV provides a discussion 
of the main results, and Section V concludes.  
1. HYPOTHESES   
This paper explores several hypotheses about the effects of multimarket trading 
on the cost of debt and corporate bond prices (i.e. yields to maturity). Issuers are 
concerned about the cost of debt, including interest costs and underwriter compensation. 
Corporate bond prices, on the other hand, reflect investors’ valuations. The issuer’s and 
the investor’s perspective are complementary since higher investors’ valuations lower the 
cost of debt.  
1.1. Multimarket Trading and the Cost of Debt 
As a starting point for the analysis of corporate bond prices, I confirm the finding 
of Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005) that global bond offerings lower the cost of debt 
financing. Firms can reduce their cost of debt either by offering bonds that are highly 
valued by investors or by minimizing issuance costs. Thus, the relevant measure of 11
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borrowing costs from an issuer’s perspective is the yield to maturity based on the net 
proceeds from the offer after deducting total underwriting fees. Using this measure of 
borrowing costs, I test whether the costs of issuing global bonds differ from the costs of 
issuing comparable U.S. domestic bonds or Eurobonds.  
1.2. Multimarket Trading and Corporate Bond Prices 
The most important component of borrowing costs is the yield to maturity that 
investors require to hold a firm’s debt.  Firms can therefore lower their cost of debt 
mainly by issuing bonds that are highly prized by investors.  Thus, I next examine 
whether investors more highly value bonds that allow for multimarket trading. I test the 
hypothesis by comparing the relative valuations of global and domestic bonds in both 
primary and secondary markets. First, I test the hypothesis that global bonds are issued at 
different yields to maturity (i.e. prices) than comparable domestic bonds of the same 
issuers. If offering yields of domestic bonds exceed offering yields of global bond by a 
significant margin, it is likely that multimarket trading provides value to investors.  
However, differences in offering prices of global and domestic bonds do not 
necessarily imply that secondary market prices also differ. Issuance prices may also be 
affected by transitory factors such as underpricing (Cai et al. (2009)) or by issuance price 
pressure (Newman and Rierson (2004)). Therefore, I further test the hypothesis that 
secondary market prices of global and domestic bonds differ. The use of secondary 
market transactions has the additional advantage of relying on a greater number of 
observations, making it possible to compare same-day prices of global and domestic 
bonds matched by issuer. The data also allow me to compute several trade-based liquidity 
measures, and examine whether multimarket trading affects corporate bond value by 
increasing corporate bond liquidity, or because of market segmentation.   
1.2.1.  Liquidity 
One channel through which multimarket trading can increase corporate bond 
value is liquidity. Bonds that allow for multimarket trading could be more liquid because 
they have a greater issue size, or because they have a wider investor base and a greater 
number of dealers. Several recent papers find a positive relationship between corporate 
bond prices and their liquidity (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Chen, Lesmond, 12
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and Wei (2007), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2008), Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti 
(2009)), suggesting that global bonds may command a liquidity premium relative to 
domestic bonds.  
Global bonds are often placed with investors in multiple markets, allowing them 
to have a greater issue size. However, prior research on the relationship between bond 
issue size and its liquidity is inconclusive. On the one hand, Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar (2007), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), and Mahanti et al. (2008) argue that 
larger issues are more liquid. On the other hand, Crabbe and Turner (1995) find no 
difference in yields attributable to size in a sample of bonds and medium-term-notes that 
have the same corporate issuer. Crabbe and Turner argue that large and small securities 
issued by the same borrowers are close substitutes. I contribute to this debate by testing 
whether global bonds have a liquidity advantage due to their greater issue size.  
In addition to their greater issue size, global bonds could be more liquid because 
they have a greater number of dealers and a wider investor base. For one thing, both the 
dealers in the U.S. market and the dealers in the Eurobond market stand ready to buy and 
sell global bonds.  The microstructure models of Demsetz (1968), Ho and Stoll (1983), 
Glosten and Harris (1988) and others predict a positive relationship between the number 
of dealers making the market in a given security and its liquidity. A greater number of 
dealers leads to more competitive dealer markets (Demsetz (1968)), and facilitates 
inventory risk management through inter-dealer trading (Ho and Stoll (1983), Reiss and 
Werner (1998)). Lower inventory risk and more intense competition among market 
makers, in turn, reduce transaction-costs.  
Liquidity may also be greater for bonds with a wider investor base. Since global 
bonds can be marketed to investors in both the U.S. market and the Eurobond market, 
their pool of potential investor is greater. Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007) 
develop a model in which transactions costs and liquidity in over-the-counter markets, 
such as the corporate bond market, depend on the number of potential investors. Their 
model predicts that illiquidity discounts are smaller if investors have access to multiple 
market makers, and the number of qualified investors is larger. Thus, global bonds that 13
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have an international investor base and a large network of dealers should be more liquid 
than domestic issues.   
1.2.2.  Bond Market Segmentation  
The original rationale for creating the global bond instrument in 1989 was bond 
market segmentation. The World Bank observed yield disparities on its dollar-
denominated debt outstanding in the Eurobond market and in the U.S. market, and issued 
the first global bond to take advantage of the disparities (see, e.g., Karpur et al. (1997), 
Fabozzi and Mann (2005)). By virtue of trading in both markets as well as between 
markets, global bonds would overcome international bond market segmentation and 
command higher prices (see, e.g., Stulz (1981), Errunza and Losq (1985)).  
Even today, explicit and implicit barriers to international investments continue to 
exist and prevent full integration of Eurobond and U.S. domestic bond markets. On the 
one hand, the U.S. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 attempts to 
discourage the holding of anonymous bearer instruments such as Eurobonds by U.S. 
investors. It does so by imposing tax sanctions on the issuer and U.S. holders of bonds, 
unless the bonds are in registered form. In practice, Eurobonds are “locked up” for 40 
days and offered exclusively to non-U.S. investors to satisfy the regulatory requirements.  
As a result, Eurobonds are rarely held by U.S. investors (Wood (2008)). On the other 
hand, overseas investors may face significant costs associated with cross-border clearing 
and settlement if they invest directly in bonds traded in the U.S. domestic market. Non-
U.S. investors may therefore be willing pay a premium for global bonds that can be 
traded and settled more efficiently.
5  
In addition, several empirical studies suggest the U.S. bond market and the 
Eurobond market are not fully integrated. Kim and Stulz (1988, 1992) find significant 
positive abnormal returns associated with Eurobond issuance, and attribute the findings to 
bond market segmentation. Kim and Stulz (1988, 1992) argue that yield differences 
between the U.S. bond market and the Eurobond market do occasionally occur, and firms 
                                                 
5 U.S. investors settle global bond transactions through DTC as they would settle domestic bond 
transactions. Overseas investors settle global bond transactions through Clearstream or Euroclear as they 
would settle Eurobond transactions. Cross-market trades in global bonds are efficiently settled between the 
depositories.  14
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that have an international reputation can take advantage of the differences by issuing 
bonds in the Eurobond market. More recently, Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005) find that 
global bond issuers have a lower cost of debt capital, and suggest that bond market 
segmentation could explain the difference.  
I contribute to this discussion by testing if securities that allow for multimarket 
trading carry a premium. In fully integrated capital markets, global bonds should be 
priced no differently than domestic bonds issued by the same firms after controlling for 
liquidity. On the other hand, systematic differences in prices of global and domestic 
bonds with similar liquidity characteristics would provide evidence against bond market 
integration.  
2. DATA   
The data for this study come from several sources. The SDC database provides 
information on new issues, including offering prices, underwriting spreads, proceeds in 
the U.S. market, and proceeds in overseas markets. I obtain information on all corporate 
bond issues that are offered by public corporations, denominated in U.S. dollars, and 
publically traded in the U.S. bond market, the Eurobond market, or both markets (global 
bonds). In addition, I keep only issues of bonds that are straight, senior, non-convertible, 
non-asset backed, and without credit enhancements. Sample bonds are issued between 
January 1998 and December 2008, and have a maturity of five years or more at the time 
of issuance. Short-term notes are excluded because they are not comparable with longer-
term bonds. Overall, 4441 new issues from the SDC database pass these filters.  
The sample is further restricted to bonds offered by global bond issuers. Issues by 
firms that never issue a global bond are deleted because my method relies on comparing 
global and domestic bonds of the same issuers. This restriction also allows me to control 
for differences in credit quality between firms with access to global bond markets and 
pure domestic issuers. Overall, 2329 new issues from SDC pass these filters; 1039 are 
global bond issues, 1179 are U.S. domestic bond issues, and 111 are Eurobond issues. 
The bonds are issued by 234 corporations, of which 205 are U.S. and 29 are non-U.S. 
firms. The distribution of the new issues sample over time is shown in Table I.  
 [Table I] 15
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Summary statistics for the sample of 2329 new issues are provided in Panel A of 
Table III. Issuance yields average 5.96% for global bonds, 6.26% for domestic bonds, 
and 6.25% for Eurobonds, but vary greatly across issuers and over time. Therefore, a 
direct comparison of yields or yield spreads without controlling for issuer and time 
effects is not meaningful. Gross spread is the total fee paid to underwriters, expressed as 
a percentage of the offer price. Gross spreads are lower for global bonds (0.56%) than for 
domestic bonds (0.8%) or Eurobonds (0.98%). This is in accordance with the findings of 
Miller and Puthenppurackal (2005), who examine issuance costs in greater detail. The 
total cost of debt is the yield to maturity calculated on issuance proceeds net of 
underwriting fees. It is the relevant measure of borrowing costs from the issuer’s 
perspective. The total cost of debt is 6.04% for global bonds, 6.37% for domestic bonds, 
and 6.45% for Eurobonds.  
Panel A of Table III next shows the issuance yield spread and the total cost of 
debt spread over U.S. Treasury securities with comparable maturities. In order to account 
for interest rate changes, all tests in this paper rely on spreads over Treasuries rather than 
raw yields. The spreads are calculated by subtracting the corresponding constant maturity 
Treasury rates from the yields. The daily yield curve for constant maturities of 2, 5, 10, 
and 30 years is from the U.S. Department of Treasury. Treasury yields for other 
maturities are obtained by standard methods.  Linear interpolation is used for 
intermediate maturities, and the yield curve is assumed to be flat beyond 30 years. 
Issuance yield spreads average 1.61% for global bonds, 1.49% for domestic bonds, and 
1.39% for Eurobonds. The total cost of debt spreads that take into account issuance costs 
are 10 to 20 basis points greater than the yield spreads.  
The average global bond issue ($1,604 million) is approximately three times 
larger than the average domestic issue ($536 million) or the average Eurobond issue 
($567 million). Foreign placements amount to 27.5% of the total proceeds for the average 
global bond, and 15.7% for the average domestic bond. Although some domestic bond 
offerings involve significant private placements with foreign investors, the median 
domestic offering involves zero foreign placements. In contrast, global bond offerings are 
typically marketed to investors in both U.S. and Eurobond markets. Table III further 
suggests that global and U.S. bonds are comparable with respect to their maturity and 16
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embedded call options. Eurobonds tend to have shorter terms to maturity, and are less 
likely to have embedded call options. The majority of sample bonds have an investment 
grade rating at the time of issuance.  
The main source of secondary market prices for global and U.S. bonds is the 
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine, commonly referred to as TRACE.  Since June 
2002, all broker-dealers active in the U.S. market have an obligation to report 
transactions in publicly registered corporate bonds to TRACE. Because global bonds are, 
like U.S. domestic public bonds, registered with the SEC, they are subject to TRACE 
reporting and dissemination. Eurobonds, in contrast, are not subject to TRACE reporting, 
and are not included in the TRACE sample. The information disseminated by TRACE 
includes bond CUSIP, transaction price, date, time, and volume. I complement this data 
with bond descriptive information from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD).  
The TRACE sample starts in 2003, the first full year of TRACE reporting. It is 
comprised of a subset actively traded bonds. Specifically, a global (domestic) bond is 
required to trade on the same day as another domestic (global) bond of the same issuer in 
order to enter the sample. Further, sample bonds are required to have at least 5 years to 
maturity at the time of trading.  There are 930 such bonds issued by 135 issuers; 480 are 
global bonds and 450 are U.S. domestic bonds. However, the number of new issues 
corresponding to these bonds is 957, since several bonds are issued in multiple tranches.  
Several filters are applied to the sample trades. First, only trades on volume of 
$100,000 or greater are included.  Retail-sized trades are discarded because their 
transaction costs account for a non-negligible percentage of the traded price (see, e.g., 
Edwards et al. (2007)). Nevertheless, even retail trades are considered when calculating 
measures of corporate bond liquidity. In addition, the data are purged of trade reports that 
were subject to corrections, are missing key information, include commission in the 
price, were entered by multiple dealers, or appear to be outliers. To identify outliers in the 
transactions data, I employ the algorithm proposed by Brownlees and Gallo (2006): 
 
where   and   denote respectively the sample mean and sample standard 
deviation of a neighborhood of 30 observations around i, trimmed by excluding the 17
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minimum and the maximum values. The value of 0.5 is added to avoid zero variances 
produced by sequences of equal prices. The idea behind the algorithm is to assess the 
validity of an observation on the basis of its relative distance from a neighborhood of the 
closest valid observations for a given bond. The algorithm removes 0.6% of trades from 
the sample. Altogether, there are 558,362 valid trades in the sample. These trades take 
place between January 2003 and March 2009 (see Table II).  
[Table II] 
In order to compare prices of bonds that do not mature exactly on the same day, I 
transform bond prices into spreads over U.S. Treasury yields. Prices are first adjusted for 
accrued interest and converted into yields to maturity. Then, yield spreads are calculated 
by subtracting the corresponding constant maturity Treasury rates from the yields, as in 
the case of issuance spreads.  
Panel B of Table III provides summary statistics for the TRACE sample. The 
summary measures have been obtained by first averaging yields and spreads across all 
sample trades for each bond and then across bonds. Trading yields are 5.95% for the 
average global bond, and 6.10% for the average domestic bond. Trading yield spreads 
average 2.28% for global bonds, and 2.43% for domestic bonds, but change greatly over 
the sample period.  The spreads range from just above 1% in January 2003 to more than 
6% in September 2008.  
[Table III] 
Global bonds trade in both the U.S. market and the Eurobond market.  Hence, I 
complement the data from the U.S. bond market with information on trading activity in 
the Eurobond market from ICMA’s TRAX
6. Compared to the U.S. bond market, the 
Eurobond market is much more lightly regulated, and detailed information on individual 
transactions is not publically disseminated. Nevertheless, I obtain from TRAX 
information on the average daily trading volume in the Eurobond market. Summary 
                                                 
6 The ICMA (the International Capital Markets Association) is the self-regulatory organization and trade 
association for the international securities market. TRAX is the ICMA trade matching and regulatory 
reporting system for the Eurobond market.  18
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statistics for the liquidity measures can be found in the liquidity section (3.3) of the 
paper.  
3. EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS 
3.1. Cost of Debt and Primary Market Prices 
I begin the analysis by testing whether global bond issuance results in a lower cost 
of debt than domestic issuance, as argued by Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005).  For that 
purpose, I test for the significance of   in the following regression model: 
 
(1)  
where each observation on the i-th issue of firm j has been transformed by subtracting the 
panel mean for firm j (i.e. the issuer fixed effect). The dependent variable is the cost of 
debt, calculated as the yield to maturity on net issuance proceeds after subtracting 
issuance costs. The model includes controls for the maturity structure of credit risk, 
market-wide credit spread movements as measured by the yield spread of the U.S. 
aggregate corporate bond index from DATASTREAM over 10-year Treasury rates, and 
embedded call options. There are also fixed time effects for each sample year, and 
indicator variables for each rating notch to control for credit spread changes. The 
specification is similar to that used by Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005), except that I 
use issuer fixed effects to control for credit quality and unobserved heterogeneity among 
firms.  
Equation (1) is estimated with issuer fixed effects to control for unobserved 
differences in credit quality between issuers of global and domestic bonds. Relative to 
firms that issue only domestic bonds, global bond issuers are likely to have unobserved 
characteristics that may increase their credit quality. For instance, global bond issuers are 
typically well-known corporations with multinational operations and global reputation 
(see Appendix A). The fixed effects model effectively compares global and domestic 
bonds issued by the same firms, and it is robust to omitted firm-specific regressors.  19
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I estimate the model on three samples of global and U.S. domestic bonds: The 
sample of 957 issues of TRACE bonds, the full sample of 2175 bonds, and a smaller 
sample of bonds offered by firms that had previously issued a global bond.  These 
regressions compare the cost of debt of global bonds against the benchmark of bonds 
issued by the same firms in the U.S. domestic market. In addition, the model is estimated 
with Eurobonds as an alternative benchmark.  
[Table IV] 
The coefficient estimates are presented in Table IV. All standard errors are 
clustered by issuer. The coefficient on the indicator for global issuance is negative and 
statistically significant. The first column indicates that global bond offerings have a cost 
of debt that is on average 16.1 basis points below comparable domestic bond offerings.  
This result is consistent with the study by Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005), who find 
that global borrowing costs are lower by 20.7 basis points. The slight difference between 
the estimated effects of global issuance on the cost of debt reflects the fact that Miller and 
Puthenpurackal (2005) cover an earlier period. If I restrict the sample period to 1996 to 
2003, the coefficient estimate increases in absolute value to 21.1 basis points.  
The maturity structure of credit spreads and market-wide credit spread changes 
are significant and have the expected signs. The call option feature is insignificant. The 
second and third columns of Table IV include additional controls for issue size and the 
percentage of the total principal raised outside the U.S. The effect of global issuance is 
still statistically significant and does not diminish in magnitude. Further, in the whole 
sample of 2175 issues, there is no evidence that issue size affects the cost of debt. 
However, there is some evidence in the sample of 957 TRACE bond offerings that larger 
issues have a higher cost of debt, and the cost of debt can be reduced by placing a greater 
percentage of the issue with foreign investors. This is consistent with the finding of 
Newman and Rierson (2004) that large corporate bond issues create price pressure 
because it is difficult to place them with domestic investors.   
The limiting assumption of the fixed effects model is that the credit risk of each 
issuer remains constant as long as its credit rating does not change. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that small changes in issuer credit quality do not result in credit rating up- or 20
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down-grades, and are correlated with global bond issuance. The summary statistics for 
bond issuance in Table I show that most global bonds are issued later in the sample 
period, suggesting that issuer reputation may have improved. To account for this 
possibility, I estimate the model for the subsample of 1083 bonds that were issued after 
the first global bond offering by a given issuer. The results are shown in the fifth column 
of Table IV. The coefficient on the indicator for global issuance decreases to minus 15.6 
basis points, but remains statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
Next, I examine whether borrowing costs for global bond issues differ from 
borrowing costs for Eurobond issues. Since global bonds are a “hybrid” of U.S. domestic 
bonds and Eurobonds, it is interesting to compare their borrowing costs not only against 
the U.S. bond benchmark but also against the Eurobond benchmark. However, in contrast 
to U.S. and global bonds, Eurobonds pay annual coupon, are not registered with the SEC, 
and tend to have lighter covenants. For all these reasons, the borrowing costs for 
Eurobonds can be expected to be higher. Indeed, the last column of Table IV shows that 
when global offerings are compared against the Eurobond benchmark, the borrowing 
costs for global bonds are 39.6 basis points lower. The test is performed on a sample of 
565 offerings by 58 firms that issue both global bonds and Eurobonds.    
Thus, I reject the hypothesis that borrowing costs with global bonds are the same 
as borrowing costs with U.S. domestic bonds or Eurobonds, and find that borrowing costs 
with global bonds are lower. I further examine whether the difference in borrowing costs 
is primarily due to lower underwriting spreads, or if it reflects higher prices (i.e. lower 
yield spreads) on global bonds. In Table V, I estimate the same regression as in Table IV 
with issuance yield spreads as the dependent variable. Yield spreads measure the relative 
prices of global bonds from the investor’s perspective. The estimates in Table V are only 
slightly lower in absolute value than the estimates in Table IV, showing that the 
borrowing costs with global bonds are lower mainly because investors require lower 
yields to hold global bonds. Issuance costs are of second order importance. The estimates 
indicate that global bonds are offered on average at yield spreads about 15 basis points 
below comparable domestic bonds of the same issuers. The effect of global issuance on 
yield spreads remains negative and significant across all subsamples.  21
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3.2. Secondary Market Prices 
The differences in offering prices of global and domestic bonds do not necessarily 
imply that secondary market prices also differ. The prices of new corporate bond issues 
may also be affected by transitory factors such as underpricing (Cai et al. (2009)) or 
issuance price pressure (Newman and Rierson (2004)). Underpricing could be less 
prevalent among new global issues if there is better information dissemination 
surrounding global offerings or more competition among underwriters for global issues. 
Issuance price pressure may be smaller for global issues if the supply shocks associated 
with large bond offerings are in part absorbed by foreign investors.  
This section examines secondary market prices of global and domestic bonds to 
distinguish between temporary factors surrounding bond offerings and permanent price 
differentials. As a first step in the analysis of trading yield spreads, I form a sample of 
trades in global and domestic bonds of one issuer that occur on the same day. In order to 
enter the sample, a global (domestic) bond is required to trade on the same day as another 
domestic (global) bond of the same issuer. However, the bonds may have different 
maturities and embedded call options. I use two methods to control for these 
characteristics. First, I create a paired sample of bonds that have no call options and 
mature within two years from each other. I conduct paired t-tests to examine if the bonds 
trade at different yields. The second method uses panel regressions to relate yield 
differentials to differences in bond characteristics. 
[Table VI] 
Table VI presents the results of paired t-tests. I construct a sample of 137 option-
free bond pairs matched by issuer and time to maturity, and calculate the average 
difference in trading yield spreads for each pair of bonds. Presented are the mean and the 
median of the differences, t-test for the significance of the difference, and results of the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test.  The mean difference for the whole matched 
sample is negative and statistically significant. Global bonds trade on average at yield 
spreads 22 basis points below those on comparable domestic bonds of the same issuers. 
However, the mean difference is much greater for below-investment grade bonds (-61 
basis points) than for investment grade bonds (-22 basis points). The difference is 22
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negative and significant in all sample years, but it is larger during the earlier period and 
during the turbulent years of 2008 and 2009.  
The paired t-tests offer a simple method of testing for differences in yields, but 
restrict the sample to a small number of non-callable bonds with similar maturities. In 
addition, they do not allow me to relate yield differentials to bond liquidity. Next, I 




where each observation on the i-th issue of firm j has been transformed by subtracting the 
panel mean for all bonds of firm j traded on day d (i.e. the issuer/day fixed effect). The 
transformation within each panel removes the firm-specific effect that may be correlated 
with the error terms. It is akin to computing the mean of the differences in spreads 
between global and domestic bonds of one issuer traded on the same day, and testing if 
the mean difference is statistically different from zero. However, the fixed effects 
transformation allows for the difference in spreads between bonds to be explained by a 
vector of independent variables. The vector includes controls for the maturity structure of 
credit spreads and embedded call options.  
[Table VII] 
Table VII presents the parameter estimates. Reported are also robust t-statistics 
adjusted for clustering by bond (i.e. both within and between panels). The coefficient on 
global is -23.8 basis points, significant at the 1 percent level, showing that global bonds 
trade at lower yield spreads (i.e. higher prices) than comparable domestic bonds issued by 
the same firms. If the sample is divided into 888 investment grade bonds and 116 
speculative grade bonds, global bonds in both subsamples earn significantly lower yield 
spreads. However, the effect of global trading is much smaller in absolute value for 23
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investment grade bonds (-11.6 basis points) than for non-investment grade bonds
7 (-51.5 
basis points). This finding is in accordance with either the liquidity hypothesis or the 
market segmentation hypothesis. Most studies of corporate bond liquidity find that 
illiquidity has a stronger impact on speculative grade bond prices than on investment 
grade bond prices (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei 
(2007), Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2009)). Also, the market segmentation 
hypothesis implies that bonds traded across markets command higher prices because 
credit risk is priced differently in each market. Thus, the premium on global bonds should 
be greater for bonds with higher credit risk.  
In line with Merton’s (1974) model of the maturity structure of credit risk, time to 
maturity has a significant positive effect on yield spreads of investment grade bonds. 
Yield spreads of speculative bonds also increase with time to maturity, which agrees with 
the findings of e.g. Helwege (2002), and Chen et al. (2007). The contribution of the call 
option feature to yield spreads is positive, and it is larger for speculative grade bonds (29 
basis points) than for investment grade bonds (6 basis points). These estimates are in 
agreement with the findings of King (2002) regarding call option values implicit in U.S. 
corporate bonds. Overall, the regression model explains 18% of the differences in yield 
spreads between different bonds of the same issuers, and the contribution of the global 
dummy to the R-squared is around 2%.  
[Table VIII] 
In order to understand what factors explain the yield differential between global 
and domestic bonds, I estimate Equation (2) year-by-year and conditional on the 
occurrence of a crisis. A crisis is said to occur on the five percent of days (82 days) with 
the largest market-wide credit spreads, where market spread is measured as the difference 
between yield to maturity for the U.S. aggregate corporate bond index from 
DATASTREAM and 10-year Treasury rates. All the crisis days occur during the second 
half of 2008 and in 2009. As the estimates in Table VIII show, the yield differential 
remains negative over the entire sample period 2003 to 2009, ranging from 20 to 45 basis 
                                                 
7 Most speculative bonds are issued as investment grade bonds but enter the speculative sample due to 
downgrades.  24
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points. However, some of the greatest differentials are observed during the crisis period 
of 2008 and 2009. During the crisis period, global bonds trade at yields 44 basis points 
below domestic bonds, which is greater than the average difference of 24 basis points. 
These findings suggest that the price difference between global and domestic bonds 
increases in times of market distress. The implications of the financial crisis for the 
spread between global and domestic bond yields are further discussed in Section IV.   
3.3. Liquidity of Global Bonds 
One argument in favor of global bond issuance is greater liquidity. Global bonds 
could be more liquid because they are larger issues, or because they have a greater 
number of market makers and a wider investor base. This section examines whether 
global bonds are more liquid than bonds issued in the U.S. domestic market by the same 
corporations. I also test if liquidity can explain the yield differential between global and 
domestic bonds.   
Liquidity is the ability to buy or sell an asset in large quantity quickly and without 
affecting the market price. I compute several proxies for corporate bond liquidity that 
have been proposed in the literature: bond age, principal, trading volume, trading 
frequency, price volatility, and the price impact of trades. Bond age and principal are 
widely used liquidity proxies that do not require transaction data. Alexander et al. (2000) 
and Edwards et al. (2007) show that trading volume of corporate bonds declines as they 
become older and settle into institutional portfolios. I measure bond age at the time of 
trading in years, and total principal issued in all markets in millions of dollars.  
The transaction-based measures of corporate bond liquidity use data from TRACE 
for the U.S. bond market complemented with information from TRAX for the Eurobond 
market.  I compute the monthly trading volume in the U.S. bond market as the sum of 
trading volume from all TRACE transactions over a period of 20 trading days preceding 
each observation. For confidentiality reasons, TRACE does not disseminate the exact 
trading volume for transactions larger than the cap value of $5 million ($1 million for 
high yield bonds). I assume that that the actual transaction volume is equal to the cap 
value. The monthly trading volume for the Eurobond market is obtained by multiplying 
the average daily volume for the previous month provided by TRAX by 20. In contrast to 25
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reporting to TRACE, which is mandatory for all broker-dealers registered in the U.S., 
only ICMA members have an obligation to report their trades to TRAX
8. Thus, the 
TRAX volume may be an imperfect proxy for trading activity in the Eurobond market. 
The total trading volume is estimated for each bond as the sum the TRACE and TRAX 
volumes.  
Next, I compute three measures of trading frequency: The monthly number of 
trades from TRACE, the monthly number of large trades from TRACE, and the monthly 
number of zero-volume days by counting days on which no large trades occur.  Large 
trades are defined as transactions on volume of $100,000 or greater. Smaller, retail-sized 
trades may not be indicative of greater liquidity (see, e.g., Edwards et al. (2007)). The 
number of zero volume days is counted over the last 20 trading days preceding each 
trade.  
Price volatility is related to liquidity through dealer inventory risk (see, e.g., Stoll 
(1978)).  I compute two measures of price volatility: the monthly price range as a 
percentage of the average price, and the coefficient of variation of the transaction price. 
The coefficient of variation is the monthly standard deviation scaled by the average price. 
Both measures are computed over the period of 20 trading days preceding an observation, 
and only large trades are used in their calculation. The measures are winsorized at the 
99.5
th percentile.  
In addition, I compute a measure of the price impact of trading related to that 
proposed by Amihud (2002). The adjusted Amihud measure is defined as the ratio of the 
monthly percentage price range to the total monthly trading volume (in millions of 
dollars). The ratio is similar to the price impact measure of Amihud (2002) in that it 
relates price volatility to trading volume. However, like Goyenko et al (2009), I use 
monthly rather than daily price changes to account for the infrequent trading of corporate 
bonds. Furthermore, I use only large trades in the numerator, and winsorize the measure 
at the 99.5
th percentile to eliminate outliers. The formula is:   
                                                 
8 The ICMA currently has 400 members in 50 countries, and its TRAX system covers the greater part of the 
over-the-counter market for international securities. Its members are mostly in European countries, and 
there is little overlap between ICMA and FINRA membership.  26
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The liquidity measures for bonds in the TRACE sample are summarized in Table 
IX. The median global issue in this sample is more than twice as large as the median 
domestic issue ($1.2 bn. vs. 0.46 bn.). Whereas 39.44% of the total principal for the 
median global bond is placed with non-U.S. investors, the median domestic bond 
involves no foreign placements. Trading volume in both the U.S. market (TRACE) and 
the Eurobond market (TRAX) is several times greater for global bonds. The average 
monthly trading volume for the typical global bond is $74.2 million in the U.S. market, 
and $11.78 million in the Eurobond market. The typical domestic bond has an average 
monthly trading volume of $14.48 million in the U.S. market, and only $0.63 million in 
the Eurobond market. The typical global bond trades 104 times per month, of which 40 
trades are large (on volume of at least $100,000). In contrast, the typical domestic bond 
trades only 30 times per month, of which merely 10 trades are large. No large trades are 
executed on 15 out of 20 trading days for the median domestic bond, and 7.6 out of 20 
trading days for the median global bond. Global bond prices also have a smaller price 
range and are less volatile than domestic bond prices. Finally, the adjusted Amihud 
measure shows that global bond prices are less impacted by large trades than domestic 
bond prices. The estimated price impact of trading $1 million is 12 basis points for the 
median global bond, and 75 basis points for the median domestic bond. These estimates 
are in the same range as those found by Edwards et al. (2007).  
 In Table X, I test whether global bonds are more liquid than domestic bonds after 
controlling for bond characteristics such as age, issue size, maturity, and embedded call 
options. As for the analysis of yield spreads, I use issuer/day fixed effects to hold 
constant the credit risk and other firm-specific determinants of liquidity. Liquidity 
measures are the dependent variables in these regressions. All measures of bond liquidity, 
except bond age and the number of zero volume days, are transformed by taking natural 
logarithms. The first column of Table X shows that global bonds trade more actively than 
domestic bonds, even after taking into account their greater issue size and differences in 27
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age at the time of trading. Column 2 reveals that the trading volume in the Eurobond 
market (from TRAX) depends even more strongly on global bond issuance than the total 
volume.  
The total number of trades from TRACE is not significantly related to either 
global issuance or bond age. It is greater for larger issues and bonds with embedded call 
options. However, the total number of trades is not likely to be a good proxy for bond 
liquidity since the majority of trades are retail-sized. The total number of trades may 
reflect retail investors’ speculation call option values, as indicated by the significant 
coefficient on the significant coefficient on the call option feature, rather than the 
capacity to execute large trades without affecting the price. In contrast, the number of 
large trades is significantly related to both global issuance and bond age, even after 
controlling for issue size and other bond characteristics. The number of zero volume days 
that considers only large transactions is also significantly smaller for global bonds.  
Both measures of price volatility are lower for global bonds, and the differences 
are statistically significant. The price range decreases as bonds season, which may reflect 
lower duration rather than improved liquidity. However, price variability as measured by 
the coefficient of variation increases with age, suggesting that more seasoned issues are 
less liquid. As expected, price volatility depends negatively on issue size and positively 
on time to maturity. The adjusted Amihud illiquidity, which is a proxy for the price 
impact of trading, is significantly lower for global bonds. This measure also shows that 
bonds become increasingly illiquid as they season, and larger issues are more liquid than 
smaller ones.  
Thus, there is evidence that global bonds have a liquidity advantage over 
domestic bonds, even after controlling for their greater issue size and other 
characteristics. Can the liquidity advantage of global bonds explain why investors require 
lower yields on global bonds? This question is examined by re-estimating the yield 
spread regressions (Equation (2)) with additional controls for corporate bond liquidity.  
[Table XI] 
Table XI shows the coefficient estimates for the indicator of global issuance and 
each of the liquidity measures. Among the liquidity measures (column 2), age has a 28
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significant positive effect on yield spreads. Each additional year of age increases the 
required yield spread by 4.4 basis points. These estimates agree with the findings of e.g. 
Alexander et al. (2000) and Edwards et al. (2007). The effect of issue size on yield 
spreads is negative but insignificant. This is consistent with the finding of Crabbe (1995) 
that issue size is not an important determinant of yield spreads once issuer credit risk is 
held constant. Also, trading volume is not significantly related to yield spreads at the 
issuer level. The total number of trades in the preceding month and the number of large 
trades are significantly related to yield spreads, but the effect is unexpectedly positive. As 
discussed before, trading frequency may be a poor proxy for liquidity. Similarly, I find no 
significant relationship between the number of zero volume days and yield spreads. As 
expected, the price range and coefficient of variation have a positive significant effect on 
yield spreads. These measures of price variability also have the highest explanatory 
power for yield spreads in terms of R-squared. Finally, in accordance with the theory, 
bonds with greater Amihud illiquidity earn significantly larger yield spreads.  
Of particular interest are the coefficients on the indicator variable for global 
issuance, which are shown in the first column of Table XI.  Regardless of the included 
liquidity measure, the coefficient on global is negative and significant. The magnitude of 
the coefficient changes very little after controlling for liquidity. The effect of global 
issuance on yield spreads remains between -22.3 and -25.4 basis points, and the increase 
in R-squared is on the order of 1% to 2%. The effect of controlling for liquidity on the 
yield differential may appear to be small because the transaction-based liquidity proxies 
are noisy compared to the indicator variable for global issuance. However, the results 
agree with the recent findings by Rossi (2009) and Wang (2009) that liquidity proxies 
explain only an incremental 1% of the cross-sectional variation in yield spreads once 
credit risk is correctly controlled for. Thus, the findings suggest that liquidity alone 
cannot fully account for the premium prices that investors pay for global bonds.   
4. DISCUSSION   
In fully integrated capital markets, global and domestic bonds of the same issuers 
should command the same prices after controlling for differences in liquidity. However, 
the coefficient estimates in Table XI show that investors demand lower yield spreads (i.e. 
pay higher prices) for global bonds that can be traded in both the U.S. bond market and 29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1212
June 2010
the Eurobond market, as well as across markets. The greater liquidity of global bonds 
does not appear to explain the yield spread differential. Thus, the evidence suggests that 
international bond markets are not fully integrated, and investors value the ability of 
global bonds to span the U.S. and the Eurobond markets.  
The results can be interpreted in terms of Stulz’s (1981) model of international 
asset pricing. Stulz (1981) shows that in the presence of barriers to international 
investment that make it costly to hold foreign assets, investors require lower returns on 
international assets that are not subject to such costs. Global bonds earn lower yield 
spreads according to this model because foreign investors face higher transaction costs if 
they want to invest directly in U.S. domestic bonds. However, the question remains why 
U.S. investors who can readily access both domestic and global bonds hold global bonds 
and do not arbitrage away the yield differentials.  
In practice, arbitrage between global and domestic bonds is limited by the costs of 
transacting in corporate bond markets. Edwards et al. (2007) estimate that average round-
trip transaction costs for a representative institutional order size of $200,000 amount to 
48 basis points. Even for large institutional orders of $1 Million, Edwards et al. (2007) 
estimate round-trip transaction costs of 22 basis points. The estimated transaction costs 
are still higher for high-yield bonds and distressed securities. For example, Edward et al. 
(2007) calculate that the round-trip institutional transaction costs increase by a further 
20.8 basis points for BB and B-rated bonds. Higher transaction costs may explain why I 
find the greatest yield differentials between global and domestic bonds of below-
investment grade issuers. Round-trip transaction costs of 40 basis points or higher would 
make it nearly impossible to profitably exploit the yield difference of 50 basis points on 
speculative grade bonds. 
Furthermore, the results in Tables IV and VIII show that the yield difference 
between global and domestic bonds widens during the credit crisis of 2008 and 2009. 
Conditional on the crisis, the yield differential almost doubles, reaching 44.2 basis points. 
This result is in accordance with prior findings that non-arbitrage bands become wider in 
a crisis (see e.g. De Long et al. (1990), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)). One reason 
is that bid-ask spreads and indirect transaction costs increase during crisis periods (see, 30
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e.g. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)), and the costs of transacting may exceed 
arbitrage profits. In addition, as shown by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) and Stein 
(2009), arbitrageurs typically face binding funding constraints in a credit crisis, and may 
be unable to take on new positions or even maintain their existing positions. For both 
reasons, arbitrage between global and domestic bonds becomes less effective in a credit 
crisis, increasing the price premium on global bonds.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Large multinational corporations increasingly raise funds by issuing global bonds. 
Global bonds resemble U.S. domestic bonds, but their distinctive features allow global 
bonds to be traded in multiple markets. They are placed simultaneously with U.S. and 
overseas investors, and can be traded in the U.S. bond market and the Eurobond market, 
as well as between markets. However, the effects of multimarket trading on corporate 
bond value are not well understood. This paper studies the effects of multimarket trading 
on the cost of debt, corporate bond prices, and liquidity. I examine primary and 
secondary market prices of global bonds and compare them with bonds issued by the 
same corporations in the domestic market. I further examine corporate bond liquidity in 
secondary markets, and its relationship to multimarket trading.  
The results confirm the finding of Miller and Puthenpurackal (2005) that global 
bond issues are associated with a lower cost of debt financing than domestic issues. In 
addition, I find that new global bond issues are priced at a premium relative to domestic 
bond issues of the same firms. On average, global bonds are offered at yield spreads 15 
basis points below comparable U.S. domestic bonds, and 30 basis points below 
comparable Eurobonds.  The difference in issuance yields does not reflect temporary 
factors such as issuance price pressure or underwriter competition because it carries over 
into secondary market prices. When I examine trading prices from TRACE from 2003 to 
2009, I find that if two bonds of the same issuer, one global and one domestic, trade on 
the same day, the yield on the global bond is on average 23.8 basis points lower. The 
difference is greater for speculative grade bonds (-51.5 basis points) than for investment 
grade bonds (-11.6 basis points). Since high yield bonds are relatively expensive to trade, 
transaction costs rule out profitable arbitrage between global and domestic bonds. In 31
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addition, the increase in the yield differential during the credit crisis of 2008 and 2009 
suggests that funding constraints may also limit arbitrage.  
I further examine the effects of multimarket trading on corporate bond liquidity. 
The results show that, compared with domestic bonds of the same issuers, global bonds 
are more liquid. They exhibit greater trading volumes in both the U.S. bond market and 
the Eurobond market, trade more frequently, and their prices are less volatile and less 
affected by trading volume. The liquidity advantage of global bonds persists even after 
controlling for their greater issue size ($1 bn. vs. $ 0.3 bn.). However, the trade-based 
liquidity measures explain no more than 2% of the variation in yield spreads, and only a 
small part of the yield differential between global and domestic bonds. 
Overall, the results provide insights into the degree of international bond market 
integration and have implications for the cost of debt. The findings imply that 
international bond markets are not fully integrated, and large issuers can lower their cost 
of debt by offering global bonds. Global bond offerings are associated with a lower cost 
of debt financing because investors require lower yields on bonds that can be traded and 
settled efficiently in multiple markets. Multimarket trading improves the liquidity of 
corporate bonds and creates value for investors.     
   32
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Sample of New Issues 
The table shows the distribution over time of the number of new issues of sample bonds. 
The sample of new issues is made up of global bonds and other bonds offered by global 
bond issuers in the U.S. domestic or the Eurobond market. The bonds are issued between 
1998 and 2008, publicly traded, U.S. dollar-denominated, fixed coupon straight bonds 





Global  U.S.   Eurobond  Total 
1998  22  169  25  216 
1999  46  125  27  198 
2000  45  89  7  141 
2001  92  142  5  239 
2002  68  110  14  192 
2003  72  144  7  223 
2004  38  66  3  107 
2005  48  129  2  179 
2006  145  99  9  253 
2007  230  67  9  306 
2008  233  39  3  275 
Total  1039  1179  111  2329 
  
Table II 
Sample of Secondary Market Transactions (TRACE Sample) 
The table shows the distribution over time of the sample of secondary market transactions 
from TRACE. This sample is made up of transactions in U.S. and global bonds matched 
by issuer and trading day that occur between January 2003 and March 2009. The bonds 
are U.S. dollar-denominated, fixed coupon straight bonds with at least 5 years to maturity 
at the time of trading, senior and unsecured. All sample trades are on volume of $100,000 





Bond Type    
Global  U.S.   Total 
2003  31584  23076  54660 
2004  37193  24115  61308 
2005  75014  43674  118688 
2006  61347  34550  95897 
2007  61356  33948  95304 
2008  70939  36965  107904 
2009  15726  8875  24601 
Total  353159  205203  558362 35
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Table VI 
Analysis of Trading Yield Spreads: Paired T-tests 
The table shows mean and median differences of yield spreads for a paired sample of 137 
global and domestic bonds. The bonds making up the pairs are non-callable and mature 
within two years from each other. Also shown are paired t-tests for the difference in yield 
spreads between global and domestic bonds, and the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Mean 
(median) marked with ** (*) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels according to the t-test 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test). 
 
  
No of Matched 
Pairs 
Mean   
Difference (%)         T-statistic 
Median 
Difference (%) 
All Bonds  
All bonds   137  -0.22**  -5.31  -0.09** 
By Rating 
Investment grade  132  -0.22**  -5.19  -0.09** 
Speculative grade
10   25          -0.61*  -1.82          -0.24* 
By Year of Trading  
2003  26  -0.41**  -2.60  -0.12** 
2004  25  -0.13**  -2.34  -0.10** 
2005  36          -0.07*  -1.93          -0.05* 
2006  61  -0.07**  -3.01  -0.05** 
2007  76          -0.05*  -1.81  -0.04** 
2008  71  -0.26**  -3.82  -0.14** 
        2009 (Q1)  32          -0.50*  -1.81  -0.31** 
  
                                                 
10 Due to downgrades, the same bond can appear in both the investment grade and the speculative grade 
sample.  40
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Table VII 
Analysis of Trading Yield Spreads:  
Panel Regressions with Issuer/Day Fixed Effects 
The table presents estimates from regressions of trading yield spreads on a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for global bonds, and on controls for the maturity 
structure of credit spreads and embedded call options. The regressions are estimated on 
panel data transformed by subtracting the issuer/day fixed effects from all transactions in 
bonds of an issuer that occur on the same day. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering 
by bond are in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ** (*) are significant at the 5% 
(10%) levels. 
   All Bonds  Investment Grade 
Speculative 
Grade 
Global bond  -0.238**  -0.116**  -0.515** 
(-4.760)  (-4.520)  (-2.970) 
Maturity (yrs)  0.103**  0.086**  0.092** 
(5.420)  (9.470)  (2.090) 
Maturity squared  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002 
(-4.560)  (-8.070)  (-1.510) 
Callable bond  0.205**  0.063*  0.287 
(2.150)  (1.910)  (1.410) 
R-squared  0.177  0.182  0.209 
No. of  trades  558362  412045  146317 
No. of bonds (clusters)
11  930  888  116 
No. of issuers   135  127  18 
  
                                                 
11 Due to downgrades, the same bond can appear in both the investment grade and the speculative grade 
sample.  41
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Table VIII 
Yield Differentials by Year and during Crisis 
The table presents year-by-year coefficient estimates of the difference between global 
and domestic yield spreads from the model in Table VII. Crisis period refers to the five 
percent of days (82 days in 2008 and 2009) with the largest market-wide credit spreads. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by bond are in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with ** (*) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels.  
 
Time Period  Global Bond  No. of Trades  No. of Bonds  R-squared 
2003  -0.368**  54660  190  0.344 
(-3.340) 
2004  -0.174**  61308  210  0.686 
(-3.670) 
2005  -0.200*  118688  241  0.329 
(-2.040) 
2006  -0.451**  95897  365  0.398 
(-3.260) 
2007  -0.082  95304  609  0.189 
(-1.580) 
2008  -0.321**  107904  674  0.091 
(-4.990) 
2009 (Q1)  -0.255**  24601  485  0.117 
   (-4.790)          
01/2003 - 03/2009  -0.238**  558362  930  0.177 
(-4.760) 
Crisis Period 
2008/2009  -0.442**  23662  507  0.115 
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Table IX 
Summary of Liquidity Measures  
(TRACE Sample) 
The table presents summary statistics for measures of corporate bond liquidity. All 
transaction-based measures including volume, number of trades, number of zero volume 
days, price range, coefficient of variation, and Amihud illiquidity are computed for the 
last 20 trading days preceding each transaction.  Price range is scaled by the average 
price. Coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of price scaled by the average 
price. Amihud illiquidity is defined as the price range divided by the total volume in 
millions of dollars. Large trades are trades on volume of $100,000 or greater. Only large 
trades are used to compute the number of zero volume days, price range, coefficient of 
variation, and Amihud illiquidity.  
 
Sample mean  Sample median 
      Global bonds  Domestic bonds  Global bonds  Domestic bonds 
Age (yrs at time of trading)  1.37  3.23  0.86  2.66 
Total principal issued ($ M)  1652.42  712.08  1197.25  462.05 
Foreign principal/total principal (%)  32.37  20.67  39.44  0.00 
Monthly volume (TRACE, $M)  124.30  46.20  74.20  14.48 
Monthly volume (TRAX, $M)  29.45  13.28  11.78  0.63 
TRAX volume/total volume (%)  17.37  8.50  15.62  3.91 
Monthly no of trades (TRACE)  186.23  79.93  104.36  29.76 
Monthly no of large trades (TRACE)  59.07  21.92  40.23  10.05 
Monthly zero volume days (TRACE)  8.11  13.63  7.57  15.00 
Price range (TRACE, %)  6.59  9.64  4.93  6.02 
Coefficient of variation (TRACE, %)  1.80  2.88  1.34  1.92 
Amihud illiquidity (TRACE, %)  0.34  1.62  0.12  0.75 
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Table XI 
Trading Yield Spreads and Liquidity:  
Panel Regressions with Issuer/Day Fixed Effects 
The table presents estimates from regressions of trading yield spreads on a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for global bonds, and on various measures of corporate 
bond liquidity. There are also controls for the maturity structure of credit spreads and 
embedded call options (not reported). The model is the same as in Table VII.  All 
liquidity measures except bond age and the number of zero volume days are transformed 
by taking natural logarithms. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by bond are in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked with ** (*) are significant at the 5% (10%) levels. 
 
Regressors  
Measure of Bond 
Liquidity  Global Bond  Liquidity  R-squared 
Age  -0.242**  0.044**  0.189 
(-4.920)  (2.970) 
Principal   -0.232**  -0.049  0.179 
(-4.410)  (-0.890) 
Trading volume   -0.237**  -0.002  0.177 
(-4.770)  (-0.110) 
No. of trades   -0.243**  0.073**  0.184 
(-4.960)  (3.210) 
No. of large trades  -0.245**  0.043*  0.179 
(-4.900)  (1.890) 
Zero volume days  -0.237**  -0.003  0.178 
(-4.700)  (-1.200) 
Price range   -0.229**  2.924**  0.197 
(-4.710)  (5.120) 
Coefficient of variation  -0.229**  0.461**  0.201 
(-4.680)  (4.870) 
Amihud illiquidity  -0.231**  0.111**  0.178 
   (-4.570)  (2.330)    
No. of  trades  558362  558362  558362 
No. of bonds (clusters)  930  930  930 
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Appendix A 
45 Largest Issuers of Sample Bonds 
 
Parent 







617446  Morgan Stanley Dean Witter  4055  25  Inv 
25746U  Dominion Resources Inc  3891  23  Inv 
842587  Southern Co  1095  21  Inv 
025537  American Electric Power Inc  602  19  Inv 
060505  Bank of America Corp  32974  19  Inv 
524908  Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc  14585  19  Inv/Spec 
209115  Consolidated Edison Inc  2087  17  Inv 
345370  Ford Motor Co  61734  17  Inv/Spec 
149123  Caterpillar Inc  6894  16  Inv 
264399  Duke Energy Corp  3544  16  Inv 
590188  Merrill Lynch & Co Inc  24042  16  Inv 
87612E  Target Corp  15516  16  Inv 
026874  AIG  9148  15  Inv 
00206R  AT&T Inc  2127  15  Inv 
370442  General Motors Corp  127326  15  Inv/Spec 
46625H  JPMorgan Chase & Co  12529  14  Inv 
580135  McDonald's Corp  4002  14  Inv 
78442P  SLM Corp  12767  13  Inv 
035229  Anheuser-Busch Cos Inc  2040  12  Inv 
125581  CIT Group Inc  10871  12  Inv/Spec 
225401  Credit Suisse Group  13273  12  Inv 
892331  Toyota Motor Corp  2237  12  Inv 
92343V  Verizon Communications Inc  11215  12  Inv 
949746  Wells Fargo,San Francisco,CA  3923  12  Inv 
126408  CSX Corp  1712  11  Inv 
438516  Honeywell International Inc  2108  11  Inv 
98385X  XTO Energy Inc  3280  11  Inv 
02209S  Altria Group Inc  17015  10  Inv 
404280  HSBC  8013  10  Inv 
494550  Kinder Morgan Energy Partners  2477  10  Inv 
12189T  Burlington Northern Santa Fe  1923  9  Inv 
244199  Deere & Co  3643  9  Inv 
319963  First Data Corp  4653  9  Inv 
441815  Household International Inc  646  9  Inv 
45031U  iStar Financial Inc  1615  9  Inv/Spec 
49811T  AIG Life Holdings (US) Inc  3941  8  Inv 
079860  BellSouth Corp  11483  8  Inv 
136375  Canadian National Railway Co  331  8  Inv 
172967  Citigroup Inc  538  8  Inv 
40414L  HCP Inc  647  8  Inv/Spec 
929903  Wachovia Corp,Charlotte,NC  3034  8  Inv 
002824  Abbott Laboratories  8217  7  Inv 
136385  Canadian Natural Resources Ltd  658  7  Inv 
263534  DuPont  8393  7  Inv 
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